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1. Efficiency, Redistribution and Empowerment 
The central concept of economic theory is efficiency.  Policies and behaviors are 
evaluated in terms of whether they add more value than they subtract.  A ―Pareto 
efficient‖ change is one which makes at least some people better off, without making 
anyone else worse off.  Pareto efficiency is a very demanding criteria, therefore, and its 
use would lead to an extreme status quo bias toward maintaining existing policies.  In 
practice, economists typically assess policies and actions in terms of ―potential Pareto 
efficiency‖: by this criterion, a policy change is efficient if the sum of the gains to those 
benefiting exceed the sum of the losses by those made worse off from the change.  In 
either case, economists emphasize positive-sum games: identifying and advocating 
policies that add more value to society than they subtract.   
Other social sciences, including political science and sociology, place a much 
greater emphasis on the concept of power.  In contrast to efficiency, an emphasis on 
power leads inevitably to zero-sum analyses of social policy and behavior.  If women’s 
decision making power within households increases, men’s decreases.  If the poor’s 
representation in political life increases, the representation of the non-poor declines.  If 
one nation’s military power increases, its rivals’ ability to conquer it or to defend 
themselves decreases.   
A zero-sum approach to empowering the poor envisions making the poor better 
off by moving from one point on a social welfare function to another, such as from A to 
B in Figure 1, in which the poor’s utility increases at the expense of the non-poor.  A 
positive-sum approach is represented by a move from A to C, from one social welfare 
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function to a higher one, in which the utility of the poor increases while that of the non-
poor is also increased or at worst unchanged.    
The term ―empowerment‖ is used with various meanings.  The definition adopted 
here is from the World Bank’s Empowerment and Poverty Reduction: a Sourcebook 
(Narayan, 2002).  Empowerment is ―the expansion of assets and capabilities of poor 
people to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control, and hold accountable 
institutions that affect their lives.‖  Empowerment increases ―one’s authority and control 
over the resources and decisions that affect one’s life.‖  This definition is useful, because 
it does not conflate hypothesized causes with their effects.  In other words, empowering 
the poor does not necessarily make them better off, it simply implies that their capacity to 
make themselves better off is enhanced.   
In most cases, strengthening the political voice of poor people is likely to make 
them better off.  Macroeconomic policy is one area, however, in which greater political 
voice for the poor is sometimes thought to have perverse effects on their welfare.  
Political parties and other forces claiming to represent the poor often advocate looser 
control of the money supply, as inflation erodes the value of debt.  However, studies have 
shown that the poor are disproportionately harmed by high inflation (Easterly and 
Fischer, 2001), in part because the financial assets of the wealthy are more likely to be 
indexed to inflation.  Limited understanding of macroeconomic processes can make 
voters vulnerable to manipulation by politicians inducing them to support policies that 
often make them worse off.  This possibility is one justification for establishing 
independent central banks and giving technocrats who are relatively immune to political 
pressures responsibility for macroeconomic and fiscal policy.  Such solutions are not 
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likely to be sustainable in the long run, however, without disseminating information 
about the effects of different policies to the poor and their representatives.  Building 
popular support for reform through education and through identifying and developing 
compensatory mechanisms where appropriate will often be required to achieve the social 
consensus need to carry through difficult reforms, such as reducing spending in the face 
of fiscal crises (Narayan, 2002: 6, 43).   
Enfranchisement of the poor was opposed by most leading 19
th
 century political 
philosophers on grounds that it would produce economically ruinous ―leveling.‖  
However, the poor were eventually enfranchised, in large part because elites began to 
realize that predictable levels of redistribution resulting from universal suffrage were less 
damaging than the prospect of unpredictable redistribution associated with political and 
social instability (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000).      
Empowerment of the poor, therefore, not only may sometimes make the poor 
worse off – particularly where poor information can be exploited by opportunistic leaders 
– it sometimes can make the non-poor better off.  In the former case, empowerment is 
inefficient, i.e. a negative-sum game.  In other cases, it is a zero-sum game, as the poor 
can benefit only at the expense of someone else.  But in many cases, it can be positive-
sum, and these opportunities should be identified and pursued by reformers.  Attempts by 
donor organizations and NGOs to empower the poor should focus on means by which the 
poor are likely to be made better off without making others worse off.  Not only is this 
approach consistent with efficiency, it will also often be the only politically feasible way 
to empower the poor.  If the non-poor currently have all of the power, then their 
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cooperation will be necessary to implement economic, political and social reforms that 
empower the poor – just as in 19th century Great Britain.   
Within the two broad categories of economic rights and political rights, the 
remainder of this chapter identifies specific areas in which the poor can be empowered 
without disempowering a substantial number of the non-poor.  Existing inefficient sets of 
rights will almost always have some constituency that will suffer when rights are 
expanded or redistributed, so reform will not be Pareto efficient in the sense of making no 
one worse off.  But often the ―losers‖ from such reforms constitute only a small, well-
organized group, such as a repressive governing regime or dominant minority clan or 
ethnic group, so that reform can easily pass the criterion of potential Pareto efficiency.   
Table 1 illustrates the argument in brief.  A zero-sum approach to empowering the 
poor through increasing their economic rights might focus on the distribution of assets or 
rights between the rich (or middle class) and the poor.  An effective positive-sum 
approach, that is shown by the evidence to improve the well-being of all economic 
classes in most instances, is to improve the security of property rights and contract 
enforceability.  This issue is addressed in section 2 of this chapter.   
A zero-sum approach to political rights might focus on increasing the political 
representation of the poor relative to that of the rich.  For example, voting turnout rates 
for the poor could be increased, potentially electing more representatives reflecting their 
interests rather than the interests of the non-poor.
1 
 To the extent that money can 
influence election outcomes, campaign finance reform and the secret ballot are two 
means of preventing the non-poor from dominating political processes.  Public financing 
                                                 
1
 Hill and Leighley (1992) find that in the U.S., states in which the poor are better represented at the polls 
offer more generous means-tested social assistance.   
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of parties and campaigns might reduce the ability of the well-off to influence poor voters 
to vote for candidates that do not represent their interests.  The secret ballot prevents 
vote-buying by moneyed interests, since it undermines the credibility of voters’ promises 
to vote for a particular candidate in exchange for a bribe.   
In contrast, a positive-sum approach to political reform examines the nature of 
political participation, and the types of demands and expectations voters have of  political 
candidates and public officials.  In particular, where voters’ exercise of political voice 
tends to focus on private goods – patronage, in effect – rather than on broader public 
policies, outcomes tend to be far less efficient.  Efficient and responsive government 
requires that citizens overcome a large-scale collective problem, by which individual 
voters face insufficient incentives to articulate their preferences for public goods, and to 
monitor the performance of public officials and exercise voice (through voting and other 
means) when needed to hold them accountable to broad public interests.  This point is 
developed empirically in section 3.     
Table 1       
  positive sum zero sum 
Economic rights Security of property rights Distribution of rights 
Political rights Nature of accountability 
relationships 
Relative participation 
levels 
 
2. Empowerment Through Property and Contract Rights  
Does effective protection of property rights benefit primarily the rich?  It is now 
widely accepted that nations with more secure property rights and effective contract 
enforcement tend to exhibit stronger economic performance (e.g. North, 1991; Knack and 
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Keefer, 1995).  What remains less clear to many, however, is whether secure property 
rights and effective contract enforcement empower the poor.  Neo-Marxist and other 
radical traditions view them as benefiting the rich at the expense of the poor.  This 
perception is based on the intuition that the poor have little property to protect, unlike 
rich landowners or capitalists.  Similarly, contractual agreements can be perceived as 
being the product of unequal bargaining power, with rich creditors, landowners or 
capitalists enforcing contract provisions against poor borrowers, tenants, employees, or 
consumers.  If wealthy elites write the laws and commercial codes and select the judges, 
legal systems may mostly protect the interests of the well-off, often at the poor’s expense.  
Privatization of communal lands without sufficient compensation has in some instances 
disempowered rural poor people in Africa and Latin America.       
Most donor agencies, however, have recently come around to the view that 
enforcement of property and contract rights is more often pro-poor, not only by 
encouraging growth in per capita incomes that are typically accompanied by reductions in 
poverty (e.g. Squire, 1993), but also through favorable shifts in the distribution of 
income.  This view holds that institutions for promoting secure property rights and 
enforcement of contracts can have powerful egalitarian effects, enabling individuals with 
little property and no political connections to invest in human capital and in small 
enterprises.  Fair and transparent procedures for property, contracts, and government 
regulation of business facilitate the entry of informal sector entrepreneurs and workers--
most of whom are low- or middle-income--into the formal sector, and promote the 
accumulation of physical and human capital, raising profits and wages (de Soto, 1989).
2
   
                                                 
2
 According to the World Development Report 2000, ―in Ghana in 1993 an investor had to obtain 24 
administrative approvals for 24 services before starting any activity—around two years of procedural 
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Predictability of rights and policies—even those seemingly biased towards the 
rich—carries enormous advantages relative to less secure economic environments.  
Strong and predictable property and contract rights are necessary for the emergence of 
well-developed financial markets
3
, which are at least as important for poor and middle-
income borrowers as for the well off, who can more easily arrange alternative sources of 
credit.  Unlike the rich, the poor may be dependent on credit for acquiring secondary-
level education, which has a high cost in terms of forgone income in developing 
countries.   
There is some evidence that government expenditures are diverted away from 
services that benefit the poor in more corrupt nations (Mauro, 1998).  Capital-intensive 
projects tend to offer more opportunities for kickbacks than health and education 
spending.   
To the extent government incompetence and corruption undermines public service 
delivery, the poor may be disproportionately affected, because they are more dependent 
on publicly-provided health services and education.  Similarly, the poor are less able to 
purchase private substitutes (security guards, alarm systems, etc.) for police services.   
If bribe seekers can price discriminate, corruption may not disproportionately tax 
the poor.  Kaufmann, Zoido-Lobaton and Lee (2000) present survey evidence from 
Ecuador that bribe payments to government officials constitute a larger share of firm 
revenues for small than for large firms.  However, this is not a general finding from these 
firm surveys, according to one of the authors of the Ecuador study.  For example, large 
and small firms pay about the same share of revenues in the form of bribes in Cambodia.  
                                                                                                                                                 
approval, with an uncertain outcome.‖  
3
 Feder et al. (1988) found that formal title to their land (controlling for other factors) improved farmers’ 
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On the other hand, household surveys consistently indicate that poorer families pay a 
larger share of their incomes as bribes in exchange for public services
4
 -- indicating that 
price discrimination is more difficult with households than with firms, and/or that poorer 
households are more dependent than richer households on public services. 
Cross-country evidence can be useful in examining whether corruption and 
uncertain protection of property and contract rights disproportionately harm the poor.  
One way to address the question is by breaking it into two parts and noting, for example, 
that property rights are significantly related to growth (e.g. Knack and Keefer, 1995), and 
that growth is associated with reductions in poverty rates (e.g., Squire, 1993).  Thus, one 
might conclude, secure property rights must make the poor better off.  However, it is 
conceivable that the source of growth matters: most episodes of growth are accompanied 
by reductions in poverty, but the exceptions could be those in which, for example, growth 
is generated by secure and stable property and contract rights rather than by public 
investments in primary or secondary education, health or infrastructure.  It is therefore 
worth presenting more direct evidence. 
For this purpose, Knack (2002a) obtained data on income share by quintile from 
the ―high quality‖ subset of the Deininger and Squire (1996) time-series compilation in 
inequality.  Average annual growth in per capita income was computed for each of the 
five income quintiles for the same period, using the purchasing power-adjusted income 
data from Summers and Heston (1991).  Barro-type growth regressions were run for each 
of the five quintiles, using the property rights indexes constructed by Knack and Keefer 
(1995) from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and Business Environmental Risk 
                                                                                                                                                 
access to credit.   
4
 This information was provided in personal correspondence from Young Lee.    
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Intelligence data.   
Depending on the period examined, and on which property rights index was used, 
the impact of property rights on growth was at worst neutral across the five quintiles, and 
at best double the impact for the bottom quintile as for the top quintile (Knack, 2002a). 
These findings strongly indicate that more secure property and contract rights improve 
incomes for all groups, not merely for those who have the most property in need of 
protection.   
Evidence showing that corruption reduces incomes for all income classes, and 
particularly for the poor, implies that empowering people in ways that reduce corruption 
are positive-sum policies.  One example is increased representation of women in politics 
and public office, which is usually advocated on grounds that it will make women and 
children better off, by re-allocating resources toward public programs that tend to benefit 
them instead of men.  However, a side benefit of increasing women’s share of 
parliamentary seats and high ministerial positions is that it is associated with significant 
reductions in corruption (Swamy et al., 2001).  Because corruption in turn is linked to 
growth, enhancing women’s representation can improve well-being for both women and 
men – even though  men’s share of high-level government positions falls.      
Mancur Olson (1994) has argued that much of the poverty in the developing 
world is the product of institutions chosen by politically connected individuals and 
groups, who tend to be well off, in their own interests.  Olson claims that the legal and 
other governmental institutions that best ensure property rights and contract 
enforceability are the very same set of institutions that best improve the welfare of the 
poor.  Results described in this section support Olson’s view--and the consensus but 
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largely untested view of the major donor institutions--that good governance not only 
reduces poverty rates but also improves (or at the least does not worsen) income 
inequality.  Improving the quality of governance is not the only way, and may or may not 
be the most effective way, of empowering the poor or of reducing poverty.  However, 
there is no evidence that an efficiency/equity tradeoff predominates in strengthening 
property and contract rights in developing countries.  To the contrary, the enormous gains 
in material welfare of institutional reform appear to benefit the poor at least as much as 
they benefit other classes. 
 
3. Citizen Voice and Clientilistic vs. Programmatic Politics 
Putnam (1993: 101) found that in the more civic regions of Italy, citizen-initiated 
contacts with government officials tend to concern public issues, while in the less civic 
regions, such contacts ―overwhelmingly involve requests for jobs and patronage.‖  In the 
more civic regions, citizens view government as a provider of necessary public goods 
from which everyone benefits, while citizens of less civic regions view government as a 
source of private goods.   
Banfield (1958) provides a fascinating case study of one of the less civic towns of 
southern Italy, in which collective action failures on the part of the citizenry resulted in 
an indifferent and corrupt government.  Collective action in the public interest could not 
be organized, because it depended on unselfish inducements, and a degree of 
interpersonal trust and organizational loyalty that did not exist in the town, where many 
villagers found ―the idea of public-spiritedness unintelligible‖ (p. 18).  Despite 
widespread dissatisfaction at the lack of a local hospital or public transportation to a 
 11 
middle school in a nearby town, there was ―no organized effort to bring pressure to bear 
on the government‖ (p. 31).  The only voluntary association in the town, comprised of 25 
upper-class men, engaged solely in social activities for the members, and did not involve 
itself in community affairs.  There were few checks on public officials, because it was not 
in the narrow self-interest of citizens to get involved: ―For a private citizen to take a 
serious interest in a public problem‖ was ―regarded as abnormal and even improper.‖  On 
the other hand, it was considered normal to lobby officials to provide personal favors (p. 
87).  Voter choices were not based on class, ideology, or the public interest, but simply 
rewarded the party providing jobs or other particularistic favors.
5
 
Empowering individual poor people, therefore, by making it easier for them to 
vote or to contact public officials, will not necessarily make them collectively better off, 
if they use this new-found voice to more effectively demand patronage.  Even nominally 
pro-poor programs that take the form of targeted redistribution -- such as free food or 
temporary employment in public works -- may have less impact on welfare than cheaper 
and broader-based programs to improve basic health and education services (Keefer and 
Khemani, 2003).  Efficient choice of public policies and effective provision of public 
goods – for most of the poor and non-poor alike -- requires changes in information, 
electoral rules or social norms that alter incentives of voter and politicians to indulge in 
patronage practices.   
Cross-country evidence on this problem is provided by several questions included 
in a Gallup International survey administered to more than 30,000 respondents in 45 
                                                 
5
 See Knack (2002a) and Boix and Posner (1998) for additional arguments and evidence on the relationship 
between ―social capital‖ and government performance.  
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countries in August, 2002.
6
  Only 13.9% of respondents said that they had contacted a 
public official (local or national) in the past year to provide their opinion on a broad 
public issue, while 22.4% replied that they had contacted a public official for help with a 
problem affecting them or their family (this is termed ―particularized contacting‖ in the 
political science literature; see Verba and Nie, 1972).  There is enormous variation across 
countries; for example only 6% of Japanese respondents contacted public officials about 
personal problems, compared to 64% for Cameroonians.  Only 5% of respondents in 
Argentina, compared to 36% in the USA, contacted public officials to provide an opinion 
on broader public issues.  The share of all contacts that are programmatic rather than 
clientilistic varies from a low of 17% for Russia to a high of 57% for the USA and 59% 
for Croatia.  Figure 2 plots in two dimensions the percentage of respondents for each 
country who report each type of contact.   
These cross-country differences appear to have enormous consequences for the 
quality of governance.  Figure 3 plots on the horizontal axis the percentage of all contacts 
that are of the programmatic sort.  The vertical axis plots countries’ scores on a ―Control 
of Corruption index from Kaufmann et al. (1999).  Countries in which contacts tend to be 
public-interested have significantly higher scores – i.e. less corruption -- on the Control 
of Corruption index (correlation = .43, significant at .004).  The relationship is similar for 
another index from Kaufmann et al. (1999) on ―Government Effectiveness‖ (correlation = 
.38, significant at .01).   
The Kaufmann et al. (1999) indexes are based primarily on perceptions of experts 
and investors.  Results are similar, however, using measures of government performance 
in the Gallup survey.  Respondents were asked whether their country – and their local 
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 See Appendix, questions 1-4.  
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community, in a similar question – was ―run by a few big interests looking out for 
themselves‖ or ―for the benefit of all the people.‖  In countries where contacts tend to be 
of the public-interested type, fewer respondents replied that their country was run by a 
few big interests (correlation = -.37, significant at .01).  The relationship with 
respondents’ perceptions of capture by ―a few big interests‖ at the local level was even 
stronger (correlation = -.47, significant at .001); see Figure 4. 
The nature of citizens’ interactions with elected and appointed officials may be 
deeply entrenched and difficult to alter.  However, there is some potential for donor-
assisted change.  First, improved information about policies, the behavior of officials, and 
their relation to outcomes can change incentives facing both voters and politicians 
(Besley and Burgess, 2003; Keefer and Khemani, 2003; Stromberg, 2001).  Voters can 
observe for themselves the private or narrowly-targeted public goods (e.g. local school 
buildings, and jobs to construct and staff them) they receive from officials, and reward 
them at the polls.  Much more information, and the ability to process it, is often required 
to credit or blame officials appropriately for their role in providing or failing to provide 
quality public services.  Greater literacy, access to free and independent media, and 
enhanced transparency of government decision making can help improve citizens’ ability 
to demand improved policies and services with respect to broad public goods, and to 
monitor and sanction poor performance.   
Political institutions also matter.  Keefer (2002) argues that the age of democracy 
is important.  In relatively new democracies, parties have had less time to build policy 
reputations, and candidates are unlikely to be able to make credible promises to all voters. 
Candidates therefore cannot win votes effectively by promising to provide broad public 
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goods, such as higher-quality health and education services.  Instead, they rely on 
targeted promises to specific individuals or groups to whom they can make credible 
promises (because of past dealings or ethnic loyalties).  Figure 5 shows that the 
percentage of contacts with public officials that are public-interest rises in more 
established democracies (age of democracy is on the horizontal axis), where reputation 
effects make promises more credible, allowing candidates to compete on (and voters to 
reward them for) providing broader public goods.  Contacting of both types is 
significantly lower in countries with closed-list proportional representation systems, 
where voters are in effect selecting only parties, not individual candidates. 
 Interestingly, in some countries where clientilism prevailed in some regions, 
ideologically-based parties effectively competed in other regions, with positive effects on  
provision of public services.  Examples include Communist parties in Emilia-Romagna 
(Italy) and in Kerala (India).  
Social capital, namely of the ―bridging‖ sort, also contributes to better provision 
of broad-based and effective public services benefiting the poor.  Where citizens trust 
each other to cooperate for the common good, they are more likely to make public-
interested contacts, but are no more likely to engage in particularized contacting.  Figure 
6 depicts the cross-country relationship between the percentage of Gallup survey 
respondents who agree that ―most people can be trusted‖ and the public-interested share 
of all contacts with officials.  Building social capital is an enormous challenge, but 
improving education, communications and transportation potentially can broaden the 
perspective of citizens and facilitate experience, understanding and compromise across 
regions, ethnic groups, and even income classes, encouraging the growth of broad-based 
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movements and organizations that monitor the efficiency and integrity of government.  
Donors must be careful, however, not to distort the functioning, membership and goals of 
individual civil society organizations by flooding them with resources (Gugerty and 
Kremer, 2002). 
4. Implications for Measuring Empowerment    
 Empowerment of the poor and other disadvantaged groups – the less educated, 
rural, women, and members of certain ethnic groups – can be measured in part through 
data collected by government and donor agencies on literacy and relative schooling for 
example.  Some aspects of empowerment, such as sense of political efficacy, different 
forms of political participation, and information regarding politics and public issues, are 
not captured very well in the standard data.  Nationally-representative surveys conducted 
by cross-country networks, such as Gallup International, Afrobarometer, 
Latinobarometer, or the World Values Surveys, are potentially useful means of collecting 
such data.  Of these networks, Gallup’s annual ―Voice of the People‖ survey is unique in 
allowing organizations to purchase space for questions.  The August 2002 Gallup survey 
results used in this chapter suggest that such surveys produce reasonably valid and useful 
data.  Demographic variables included in the surveys would readily permit comparison 
between the poor and non-poor of (for example) level of political information, efficacy, 
participation rates, satisfaction with various public services, etc., were questions on those 
topics to be added to the survey.
7 
 The appendix provides a list of possible questions.  
Further thought is needed regarding questions on information that would be applicable to 
respondents in countries with differing political systems and salient public issues.                    
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See appendix, questions 5-17, for possible ways of asking about these issues.   
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Appendix: Survey measures of empowerment   
 
Included in August 2002 Gallup International ―Voice of the People‖ Survey: 
 
1. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be 
too careful in dealing with people? (Gallup International, 2002; World Values Surveys, 
1995) 
 
Most people can be trusted  
Can’t be too careful  
Don’t know  
It depends (volunteered) 
 
2. Generally speaking, would you say that this country is run by a few big interests 
looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all the people? (Gallup 
International, 2002; World Values Surveys, 1995)  
 
Run by a few big interests 
Run for all the people 
Don’t know 
 
3. Generally speaking, would you say that your local government is run by a few big 
interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all the people? 
(Gallup International, 2002)  
 
Run by a few big interests 
Run for all the people 
Don’t know 
 
4. Have you contacted any public officials (either local or national) in the last year, either 
for help with a problem affecting you and your family, or to provide your opinion on a 
broader public issue? (Gallup International, 2002)  
  
[Mark all that apply] 
 
For help with a problem  
To provide my opinion on a public issue 
Yes (on something else—volunteered)  
No  
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Not included in August 2002 Gallup International ―Voice of the People‖ Survey: 
 
5. I’m going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I’d like 
you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether 
you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it. (from World Values 
Surveys, 1995)  
 
Signing a petition 
Joining in boycotts 
Attending lawful demonstrations 
Joining unofficial strikes 
Occupying buildings or factories 
 
6. How would you rank the importance of the following activities as part of the job of 
members of the national legislature: 
 
Helping people in their districts who request favors or help with personal problems   
Making sure their districts gets their fair share of government money and projects       
Working on issues affecting the nation as a whole  
 
7. How would you rank the importance of the following reasons for preferring one 
political party over another? 
 
a. The policies that the parties advocate affecting the nation as a whole 
b. The share of government money and projects going to the part of the country in which 
you live  
c. The help you or your family may get if you need a favor or help with a personal 
problem  
 
8. Which statement do you feel is closer to the way things really are: with enough effort 
we can wipe out political corruption OR it is difficult for people to have much control 
over the things politicians do in office.  
 
9. How much do political parties help make the government pay attention to what the 
people think: a good deal, some or not much?  
 
10. How much do elections make government pay attention to what the people think: a 
good deal, some or not much?  
 
11. How much does having interest groups make government pay attention to what the 
people think: a good deal, some or not much?  
 
12. Do you think that the parties pretty much keep their campaign promises or do they 
usually do what they want after the election is over?  
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13. Have you encountered any of these problems with your local public schools during 
the past 12 months? (Mark all that apply) 
  
No textbooks or other supplies   
Poor teaching   
Frequent and unjustified absence of teachers    
Overcrowded classrooms    
Facilities in poor condition   
Illegal payments required    
No experience with public schools in last 12 months   
None of the above   
 
14. Have you encountered any of these problems with your local public clinic or hospital 
during the past 12 months?  (Mark all that apply) 
   
Frequent and unjustified absence of doctors  
Treated disrespectfully by staff    
No drugs available   
Long waiting times   
Facilities not clean   
Illegal payments required   
No experience with public clinic/hospital in last 12 months  
None of the above   
 
 
